In the Middle
East , the Western superpower is withdrawing its occupying troops.
In Egypt ,
the sudden overthrow of a military-backed autocracy, followed by ‘a series of
ephemeral revolutions’, plunges the country into a state of political
uncertainty and general insecurity; foreign ambassadors are threatened. Various
Western governments vie for influence in the new Egypt ;
but it is a regional power, Turkey ,
that takes advantage of the power vacuum to revive the dominant role it once
exercised over the region.
It is 1801, and Bonaparte’s
Army of the East is evacuating from Egypt ; hard on its heels come the
Ottoman Turks. Three years earlier, the French invasion has routed Egypt ’s Mamluke military dynasties; in the
free-for-all that ensues after the evacuation, Istanbul sees its chance to reassert its
former dominance over a province that no longer paid much more than nominal
allegiance to the Sultan.
In the Egypt of the Arab Spring today,
people joke about ‘Ottomania’. When Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Cairo this month, he was
greeted as a cross between a nationalist hero and an unlikely rock star. He
made public speeches and gave television interviews as if he were running for
president of Egypt .
His uncharismatic picture was plastered on billboards all around Cairo ; crowds gathered
behind rope lines to shake his hand; and journalists covered his every move.
To a hyper-sensitive Egyptian
psyche in search of dignity, Erdogan embodies empowerment. To a newly-liberated
Egypt desperate for role
models, Turkey represents
the paradigm of a successful Islamic democracy, a versatile hanger on which the
fractious factions of Egyptian society can hang their mantle: a secular democracy
for the liberals; a military power for Egypt ’s military-industrial
complex; a free-market economic success for the capitalists; an Islamist party
for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan seems to hit all the right notes: a
defender of his country’s national honor over the Gaza
flotilla debacle and a champion of Syrian revolt and Palestinian statehood, heralding
a remarkable turnaround in foreign policy for Israel ’s staunchest ally in the
region.
But if the Egypt of Tahrir
looks to Turkey
as the unique regional, Muslim-majority role model, the relationship is a
co-dependent one. For some time now Turkey ,
repeatedly rebuffed by the European Union, has been turning eastward to the
traditional sphere of influence of the Ottoman Empire :
the Arab world. The Turkish charm offensive took many forms in Egypt before
the January 25th Revolution, from the flagship Turkish luxury retailer
Beymen to wildly popular Turkish television dramas.
But my first direct inkling of
Turkey ’s
new role in the Arab Spring came three weeks after President Mubarak resigned
on Friday, February 11th. Two days after witnessing that unforgettable
moment first-hand in Tahrir Square ,
I left for a long-planned trip to India . Miraculously, Cairo Airport
was open and operational, and I was able to fly to Delhi
to join the University
of North Carolina tour
group I was traveling with. Three weeks later, on the plane returning to Cairo , I wondered what the new post-revolution Egypt would be
like. The first surprise came promptly upon landing at the airport: instead of
standing in line at passport control, passengers of all nationalities seemed to
be allowed to just wave their passports in the air and sail right through. I
was told that, since Turkey
had announced that it was waiving visa requirements for Egyptian and Tunisian
nationals as a gesture of solidarity with their revolutions, Egypt could do no less than follow Turkey ’s open
door policy.
This apparent abandon of security
measures would have been alarming were it not for the fact, shortly before my
flight to Cairo
landed, an imposing young Egyptian had risen from his seat and authoritatively
collected the passports of all the passengers, inspected them, and returned
them with a smile. It takes more than a
revolution to disrupt Egyptian bureaucracy, inherited from centuries of Ottoman
rule.
That heritage is selectively
recalled with fondness today, but that was not always the case. In that part of
the world, it has been said, the past is not history, it is not even past. The
last time Egypt
found itself in such a crisis, a country up for grabs, so to speak, was after
the brief French occupation 200 years ago destroyed the existing regime and
left a power vacuum. No one could have predicted, at the time, that it would be
an obscure Ottoman officer, Mehmet Ali, who would take advantage of the
infighting in Egypt to shoot to power and persuade an insecurity-weary Egyptian
public and ambitious Azhar clerics to accept him as Viceroy of Egypt. He would go
on to found a dynasty that lasted 150 years, ending only when King Farouk was
deposed by the 1952 coup d’état of the Colonels. Today, if Field Marshall
Tantawi and the Supreme Military Council do not abide by their promise to hand
over power to a civilian government, Egypt is in danger of having had a
revolution that brought the military to back to power. That is one reason the
country’s liberals are pinning their hopes on a Turkish-style democracy that
accommodates, within strict limits, the influence of both the military and the
religious parties.